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Apart from the 17th BRICS Summit which took place in Rio de Janeiro, it is fair to say that the most important event on the “changing world order map” was French troops packing their stuff and leaving Senegal, so far one of the most loyal allies of Paris on the continent. It is, however, no surprise in the context of changes and transformations that especially Francophone Africa is experiencing in last few years. The withdrawal is not only seen as a military withdrawal per se, but as the end of one chapter that has been present in West Africa since the colonial days. For generations, French-Senegalese cooperations seemed unshakable and French physical presence in Senegal somewhat “natural”, Dakar itself is a favorite spot for many French tourists but also retired people trying to find new homes there.
However, since 2020, West Africa is facing unprecedented waves of transformation which many in Europe seem to not understand. From time to time, the media shows coverage from capital cities such as Niamey, Ouagadougou or Dakar, with people chanting slogans with clear message, anti-imperialist rhetoric, and a need to transform relations between the former colonial power and West African former colonies.
What is quite interesting on the case of Senegal is, that a few days after the French withdrawal, the Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye, who orchestrated it as a deliberate signal of rupture, landed in Washington D.C., where he (and a few other West African presidents) met with U.S. President Donald Trump. The symbolism could not be clearer: Senegal is seeking new partnerships, and the United States is ready to listen.
The timing is not coincidental. France’s diminishing footprint in West Africa is creating a power vacuum, one that both old and new global powers are eager to fill. The Senegal case is emblematic of a much broader transformation—a recalibration of Africa’s role in a shifting world order, driven by a new wave of decolonization and strategic rebalancing.
The End of a French Era?
Senegal has long been a linchpin of France’s African policy. As the former capital of French West Africa, Dakar symbolized both colonial command and post-independence cooperation. French troops remained stationed in the country under the pretext of shared security, counterterrorism, and training. But over time, public sentiment shifted. France’s involvement in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger soured its image across the region. By the 2020s, “France dégage” (“France, get out”) had become a rallying cry not just for radical activists but for mainstream voters.
The withdrawal from Senegal was preceded by France’s expulsion from Mali (2022), Burkina Faso (2023), and Niger (2023), driven by military juntas that presented themselves as defenders of national sovereignty. In the case of Senegal, the story is slightly different because Senegalese political system is more democratic, and the decision to follow the same path came not from a military regime but from a legitimately elected president with strong popular backing. Faye’s victory in 2024 was itself a reflection of public frustration with the political establishment and a desire to reclaim both economic and strategic autonomy. For Senegalese youth especially, President Faye has represented big hopes of removing Paris-backed “old guards”, and in this sense, France’s departure is, not just a tactical retreat—it is a symbolic defeat.
A New Decolonization Wave? Perhaps
The events in Senegal form part of a broader continental movement—what some have called “Decolonization 2.0.” Unlike the independence struggles of the 1950s and 60s, this new wave is not about setting up new states or proclaiming territorial independence, but about control over resources, strategic decisions, military bases, and (perhaps) digital infrastructure. It is also a generational issue, as we see the older generation, in majority of cases super loyal to France, being replaced by younger leaders, very often in their thirties and forties, who are rejecting the logic of dependency.
Faye, along with Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traoré and Mali’s Assimi Goïta, are trying to reposition Africa as an actor—not a passive terrain—in global politics. Although from the EU perspective, many of the West African regimes may seem to be just military dictatorships, their popular support has been researched by academics.
This new generation is less bound by Cold War loyalties or former colonial ties and tend to make use of a multipolar world, engaging with China, Turkey, Russia, the United States, and Gulf States, or BRICS based on specific interests, not inherited alliances and unchangeable agreements.
A part of this “new wave of decolonization” is an obvious Pan-Africanist rhetoric, not only in revolutionary speeches but in actual policy: the establishment of African cryptocurrency experiments, anti-French cultural policies, regional military cooperation outside Western frameworks, and attempts to build common positions on global AI governance, climate finance, and trade.
Russia’s Shadow Diplomacy
And where is Russia? From the EU perspective, Russia’s role in global politics tends to be overestimated. But it is obvious, that ever vacuum left by one power must be filled by some other(s). While in the case of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, the Russian link is visible, in the case of Senegal as documented by President Faye’s visit to Washington, D.C., it is less obvious.
Russian engagement in West Africa is not primarily ideological—it is opportunistic. It exploits resentment toward Western powers, offers transactional security assistance, and promotes itself as a partner in sovereignty. The narrative is simple: Russia never colonized Africa. This framing resonates with populations disillusioned by the post-colonial promises of France and the conditional aid policies of the European Union.
Moreover, Russia’s diplomatic offensive is now often coordinated with broader BRICS+ strategies. Senegal has shown interest in deeper ties with this bloc, especially in the context of calls for African representation in global governance reform, at the same time, Dakar shows a clear multipolar policy by the aforementioned visit to the White House.
Washington’s Comeback
After the withdrawal of USAID, many observers looked at the US as a withdrawing power which is leaving space for the “newcomers”. As a surprise, Donald Trump’s second administration has renewed its focus on Africa, this time not so much through the lenses of human rights, democratization, and humanitarian issues, but through the lens of security, trade competition with China, and energy markets.
Faye’s Washington visit was structured less like a traditional diplomatic tour and more like a strategic negotiation. Senegal seeks security guarantees, investments in infrastructure and digital development, and a voice in global forums. The U.S., meanwhile, is eyeing Senegal’s stability, offshore gas reserves, and its potential as a regional ally in a volatile Sahel.
Trump’s messaging was devoid of liberal moralism but clear in its transactional tone. That approach may well suit Faye’s vision: sovereign, pragmatic, and multi-aligned. Unlike previous African leaders who saw alignment with Washington as an end in itself, today’s generation sees it as a tool—one of many in a diversified geopolitical toolkit.
Conclusion
France’s departure from Senegal may appear to be a tactical retreat, but in the broader historical frame, it is part of a continental repositioning. President Faye’s visit to Washington signals not a return to Cold War alignments, but the emergence of an African diplomatic strategy rooted in autonomy and diversification. Of course, where this all is heading to, we do not know yet. However, the decolonization of the 21st century is unfolding not with revolutionary violence, but with policy shifts, diplomatic realignments, and assertive leadership. Whether the world’s powers understand this shift—or continue to play by old rules—will determine not just Africa’s future, but maybe even the shape of the international system itself.
