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After 2000, Russia slowly began to renew its former ties with the Global ties, interrupted by 1990s withdrawal from Africa and internal economic and political problems inside Russia. Things began to move more visibly not only after South Africa became a member of BRICS since 2010 but especially after 2014 when Russia began to occupy the Crimea and relations between the West and Russia continued to worsen. Historical relations and generally the good name of the former Second world (former socialist camp) in Africa as well as pragmatism of many African leaders paved the way towards more fruitful relations.
Africa offers a huge market with constantly growing – and the youngest – population (now at around 1,5 billion inhabitants). While Russia is neither China, nor the EU or the USA, it still offers a variety of things which African countries may use, from heavy industry and mining technologies, nuclear energy, to weaponry and security related elements. The crucial point of Russia-Africa relations was surely the first Russia-Africa summit in 2019, that took place in Sochi. This event has changed the landscape of mutual relations and more large-scale projects came into being since then.
Russia has also continued to build its image as a peacemaker and mediator such as in the conflict in Libya. There, Khalifa Haftar became in 2015 Russia’s main partner and Moscow, despite being one of many foreign actors to support Haftar, kept and maintained its image of a skilled mediator despite having rather limited space for manoeuvring.[1] However, despite achieving some significant “return” to Africa, Russia has rather limited economic opportunities caused on one hand by rather poor economic performance (compared to almost endless natural resources) with the economy of the size of Spain, as well as by ongoing war in Ukraine and international sanctions. For many years, Russia’s main activity in Africa was the so-called “Kalashnikov diplomacy” (see below) which means the support of military trade as well as support of operations of private military group, most notably the Wagner Group, operating in last few years in the Sudan, Libya, Central African Republic, Mali, and other countries.[2]
For the Czech government, the fight against Russian narrative in Africa became one of the priorities, according to official statements and strategies, and this goes in line with other nations’ strategies in Africa. However, fighting Russian narrative has shown certain limits in Africa due to the fact that many African countries simply do not listen to what the West says the way they did twenty years ago. Such a shift is not only a part of changing world order in which multipolarity becomes a norm, but it also shows a rather declining role of the USA and the EU as “mentoring” and “protecting” bodies. For many African leaders, it is important to keep their economies open to a variety of foreign partners regardless current ideology. Adherence to BRICS or Russia and China, to be more specific, may only mean that certain African countries wish to be fully participating in multipolar world and its benefits instead of being dependent on one specific country or one “ideological” lens.
Form the security point of view, West Africa represents the biggest fear that he West has, after successful coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Niger, that Russia would become more important at least in military sense. Recent withdrawal of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso from ECOWAS, accused of visibly following Western notes, is just an example.[3] In a way, it is already becoming. The truth is that from the media point of view it may seem as if Russia gains large support especially among West African youth. All kinds of reports show young West Africans waving Russian flags (which in many cases can be remade French flags due to similar colours). Personal observation in several West African countries and debates with civil society members as well as academics show that France is losing ground, but it does not necessarily mean that Russia is being unconditionally welcomed and celebrated as a new dominant power in the region. In the case of Mali, it has been reported that the reasons why the French were replaced by the Russians was the inability of the French troops to prevent the terrorist groups from entering central and southern parts of Mali so that the new government had to in a “more sincere” partner.[4]
What should not be underestimated is that unlike China, Russia is present in Africa primarily via the so-called “Kalashnikov diplomacy,” a term used widely also in academic literature to describe the activities of Russian private military companies (PMCs).[5] This policy is again the step to securitization of the region as the battleground between the foreign powers. The presence of PMCs is led along several lines with the aim to: 1) get support in the UN; 2) to establish control over migration flows; 3) to end the French hegemony in the region.[6]
Moreover, Russia is presenting their partnership as mutually beneficial and focusing on political (or future political) elites instead of global NGOs activities typical for the West. This means, that Russian approach is more in the line of building cadres, who will be able to run the country in following years keeping well-established ties with Russia instead of imminent aims to improve situation of masses. Bilateral and multilateral relations between Russia and Africa increased since 2014,[vii] and Africa has become an essential “playground” due to its significant voting potential at the UN (54 member states from Africa). Besides this, there exist a number of other “channels” which Russia uses such as security cooperation, conventional engagements through Russia-Africa summits, as well as scholarships.[8]
For Central European countries such as the Czech Republic, Russian increased presence in Africa should not be so much about fighting Russian narrative on the continent but to reconsider its historical, economic and educational ties with so many African countries. Only by honest and mutually beneficial approach the “hearts and minds” of African partners can be won, not by shallow anti-Russian approach which no one takes seriously in many African countries due to multipolarization, disappointment from the Western neo-patrimonial approach as well as new opportunities coming from the BRICS countries and others. This does not mean to resign on diplomatic and political debates about what the world looks like and should look like. This also does not mean the EU including the Czech Republic should not be worried about Russia’s increased presence in Africa. It only means that without a proper economic diplomacy, investment policy, and fair and equal approaches, fighting Russian narratives in Africa will be a very difficult task to undertake.
[1] Scepanovic, Janko, ‘Honest Broker or Status-Seeker: Russia’s Policy in Libya.’ Problems of Post-Communism, 2021.
[2] Siegle, Joseph. "Russia and Africa: expanding influence and instability." Russia’s Global Reach: A Security and Statecraft Assessment (2021), 82.
[3] Wong, Vicky, Ecowas: Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso quit West African bloc, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947
[4] Fane, Ahmadou and Issiaka Kansaye, ‘Crise securitaire et repli identittaire dans la gouvernance coutumiere a Bandiagara,’ in: Conflits et Terrorisme au Mali et au Sahel. Régards croisés, ed. by Modibo Diarra et al. Bamako: L’Harmattan, 2024, 267.
[5] Issaev, Leonid, Alisa Shishkina and Yakov Liokumovich ‘Perceptions of Russia’s ‚return‘ to Africa: Views from West Africa.’ South African Journal of International Affairs 29, no. 4 (2022), 425.
[6] Ibid., 428.
[7] Doboš, Bohumil, and Alexander Purton. ‘Proxy Neo-colonialism? The Case of Wagner Group in the Central African Republic.’ Insight on Africa 16.1 (2024), 8.
[8] Siegle, Joseph. "Russia and Africa: expanding influence and instability." Russia’s Global Reach: A Security and Statecraft Assessment(2021): 80-90.
