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The Turkish president has announced on several occasions his desire to meet Bashar al-Assad within a Russian mediation framework. During the Syrian president's speech at the Arab-Islamic summit on Nov 11, 2024, the Turkish president left the hall, prompting the media to speculate that he was annoyed by Bashar al-Assad's presence at the summit. However, the Turkish Foreign Ministry quickly justified the matter by stating that President Erdoğan had to leave to have a conversation with the Saudi king outside the hall, and the Turkish ambassador to Saudi Arabia represented him at the meeting.
The Syrian-Turkish relationship is very complicated. Although the Turks support the armed opposition factions spread over a wide geographical area in northern Syria, they are forced to deal with Bashar al-Assad because they sense a threat to their national security in the event of Israeli expansion in Syria, especially if they ally with the Syrian Democratic Forces, which harbor animosity toward Turkey. Israel is a regional power that cannot be underestimated, in addition to having significant international influence due to its lobbying groups in various countries around the world, headed by the United States, which poses a threat to the regional influence that Turkey seeks to strengthen in Syria and Iraq.
Bashar al-Assad and his brother Maher are in a state of severe military weakness, and they are unable to engage in military engagement with the Israelis. However, Bashar al-Assad's media discourse is anti-Israeli, indicating his adherence to the Iranian axis, especially since his territories are open to various militias supported by Tehran, and his state serves as a transit point for weapons to Hezbollah. This situation has led Israel to aggressively attack Syrian territories, seizing several new areas in the Quneitra province and establishing new observation points on the border. Despite the presence of eight advanced Russian observation points on the Syrian-Israeli border, the latter has not engaged with Israeli soldiers; rather, most Israeli air sorties have passed through the Golan Heights, under the watch of Russian forces. Since the Russians are partners with the Turks, it seems they informed the Turks about the potential expansion of Israeli operations into wider Syrian territories, reaching Damascus.
The Israelis are not interested in occupying Damascus, but they may be forced to do so. Despite the qualitative number of Israeli airstrikes on Iranian Revolutionary Guard advisors and Hezbollah fighters deployed in Syria, the number of Iranian military advisors in Syria has not changed. Iranian Foreign Minister's advisor "Ali Asghar Haji Kabir" stated to the Novosti agency on Nov 14, 2024: "The presence of our military advisors in Syria remains ongoing, and there are no decisions regarding changes in the number of our forces and personnel; everything is still as it is in this regard." This statement aligns with that of Ali Larijani, advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, during his visit to Lebanon on Nov 15, 2024, where he confirmed continued support for the resistance and the Lebanese state, ensuring Hezbollah's survival.
Turkey, which despises Bashar al-Assad's regime, prefers the Iranian presence in Syria over an Israeli alternative. Iran is a state with an Islamic regime that cannot develop Syria politically, economically, and socially to become equivalent to Turkey. Therefore, the Turkish partnership with the Assad regime under Iranian-Russian tutelage is economically and geopolitically suitable for Turkey. If Bashar al-Assad remains the ruler of Syria and forces Tehran to withdraw from Syria under a regional settlement overseen by both America and Russia, Turkey would be the logical alternative to Iran, especially concerning development and economic affairs. Certainly, Ankara will impose its conditions on the crumbling Assad regime so that the opposition participates in his government, and the Syrian army includes armed opposition factions. Since they are militarily stronger than the Syrian army, this will ensure Turkey's access to the Syrian military institution, meaning that Syria's sovereign decision, even with Assad's presence, will be in Turkey's hands, which will compel the Syrian armed forces to engage with the PKK militants spread among the Syrian Democratic Forces.
This scenario is very beneficial for Turkey, and the only hindrance to this scenario is if Israel expands its territory and occupies Damascus. If this happens, it would mean forming a united front of (Israel, the international coalition against terrorism, the Syrian Democratic Forces, and Syrian opponents "Druze, Sunni Arab tribes, and Syrian factions spread across the 55 area") to prevent Shiite expansion from Iraq to Syria. This front could also form an advanced force to fight the Iraqi Popular Mobilization militias if necessary. Certainly, the presence of Bashar al-Assad and his brother Maher in Damascus holds little significance, as international confidence in their shift from the axis of resistance to the western axis has disappeared. This would mean the escape of Alawite officers towards the Syrian coast under Russian protection, pushing remnants of the Syrian army from the Sunnis to be partners in a project to confront the spread of Shiite political Islam in Damascus. This will certainly create the nucleus of a Syrian army under international tutelage and generate the possibility of creating an Alawite canton on the Syrian coast adjacent to the Turkish Alawites, which Erdoğan does not desire.
From here, President Erdoğan seeks in many of his speeches to focus on the following two aspects:
First:
The necessity of the American withdrawal from northeastern Syria, as he wishes to fill the vacuum in that area. If he achieves this, it would allow Turkey to play the role of the policeman in northern Syria, where it would cooperate with the Tanf base to prevent Iranian infiltration into Syria. This is, in fact, a smart plan that could be less costly for Washington and aligns with Trump's desire, which was retracted in December 2024, regarding the American military withdrawal from Syria. Certainly, this plan would cut off Israel's path if it decided to expand in Syria and cooperate with the Syrian Democratic Forces and the international coalition there. However, it would enhance Turkey's regional power, which is not desired by Israel and the Arab states. But if this happens, it will thwart the Israeli expansion project regionally.
Second:
Maintaining the Syrian regime by announcing normalization with Bashar al-Assad, thus ensuring Turkey a long-term war of attrition between the Shiites and the Israelis, as Assad is incapable of preventing Iranian expansion in Syria, as he is, in fact, an Iranian product. This option will cause upheavals in the region, eliminate Arab-Israeli peace projects, and elevate Turkey's status in the Middle East as the most stable place. It will also lead to Sunni-Shiite cooperation in the region under the pretext that the Shiites support the Palestinian cause and stand with Arabs against the Israelis.
From here, the best option for the American-Israeli allies may be for Israel to expand into Syria and eliminate Bashar al-Assad and his brother, as they are Iranian agents and collaborators in financing Hezbollah terrorism. This approach would be acceptable both Arab and internationally as part of the counter-terrorism initiative, especially if a new Syrian government is formed that includes the Kurds, Syrian opposition, and elements of the Syrian regime, under Arab oversight involving Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Egypt. This option may be favorable for President Trump, who aspires to achieve a peace initiative between Israelis and Arabs. If this scenario unfolds, the Middle East may avoid a significant regional war between Israel and Tehran. However, if this does not happen, the situation in the Middle East could develop into an international conflict reminiscent of what occurred during Desert Storm in 2003, but this time in Iran, not in Iraq.
