.png "white on transparent (1)")
The role exchange among Syrian state officials has become a familiar scenario for the Syrian people. Since Bashar al-Assad assumed power, a balance has existed between the economic figures associated with Maher al-Assad and those aligned with Bashar. Maher al-Assad strategically employed traditional Damascus merchants, such as Mohammed Hamcho[1], as fronts for his wealth, while also relying on certain smugglers for illicit operations, including Wisam al-Assad and the Barakat family from the Syrian coast, as well as the Berri and Qatirji families in Aleppo and its countryside.
In contrast, Bashar al-Assad focused on recruiting a new generation of merchants to manage his assets, with his cousin Rami Makhlouf being a notable example. Following the imposition of international sanctions on the regime's economic figures, Bashar swiftly initiated changes, replacing Rami with individuals like Samer Foz. After sanctions were placed on Foz, figures associated with Asma al-Assad, such as Khadr Ali Taher and Yassar Ibrahim, emerged. The Economic Office was established, overseen by a group including Firas Klass[2], Lina al-Kanaya[3], Dana Bashkur, and Luna al-Shibl.
The Economic Office was not completely loyal to Iran; Khadr Ali Taher, nicknamed "Abu Ali Khadr," imposed financial levies on several merchants affiliated with Iran. In response, Iran requested that Syrian security eliminate him. However, the Economic Office did not act on this; instead, it sought to secure a concession from him regarding certain companies for businesspeople close to Asma al-Assad, particularly Yassar Ibrahim.
Weeks later, on April 1, 2024, Israel targeted the Iranian embassy in Damascus in an airstrike, leading Iran to feel betrayed by the Syrian regime. Given that the Economic Office under Asma al-Assad was not entirely loyal to Iran, a decision was made to marginalize this group. Suddenly, Asma al-Assad announced her withdrawal from her duties due to cancer, followed by the assassination of presidential advisor Luna al-Shibl. Additionally, Yassar Ibrahim was poisoned, rendering him nearly incapacitated. Lina al-Kanaya's husband, MP Muhammad Hamam Masouti[4], was barred from running for the Syrian People's Assembly, and Luna al-Shibl's husband, Mohamed Ammar Saati, was removed from the leadership of the Syrian Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party, a position he had held since 2013, and was also prohibited from running for the People's Assembly in 2024.
These purges of Bashar al-Assad and his wife's associates prompted Maher al-Assad to fill the void. The economic figures aligned with Maher are primarily merchants with a long-standing history in commerce in Damascus and Aleppo, including prominent figures like Fares al-Shehabi, the head of the Aleppo Chamber of Commerce, and Damascene economists Mohamed Saber Hamcho and Mohamed Omar Mo’men al-Khaimi. Maher al-Assad’s economic policies resemble those of his father, who relied on Damascus merchants to manage Syria’s economic activities, notably the late Ratib al-Shalh and Saeb Nahas. Even Maher al-Assad's office is managed by General Ghassan Bilal, son of Colonel Nafi' Rajab Bilal, a friend of Hafez al-Assad.
The only economic figures associated with Maher al-Assad lacking a commercial background are from the Qatirji family, notably Mohamed Bara Rashid Qatirji and his brothers Hossam and Ahmed. Israel successfully assassinated Mohamed Bara Qatirji in a July 2024 airstrike. His profile was trusted by Iran and Hezbollah, as he undertook roles that traditional Damascus merchants could not, particularly in oil smuggling from autonomous regions to other parts of Syria—activities that typically require direct engagement with clients, a task better suited for gangsters than merchants.
Many Syrian security officials attended the mourning ceremony for Mohamed Bara Qatirji, while none were present for Luna al-Shibl's. This disparity indicates that the current era favors figures aligned with Maher al-Assad, who are acceptable to Iran.
This trend is further evidenced by the successful candidacies of Mohamed Saber Hamcho and Mohamed Omar Mo’men al-Khaimi in the 2024 Syrian People's Assembly elections[5] for the Damascus district, despite Hamcho having abstained from running in the previous parliamentary cycle, which was dominated by Firas Klass and Asma al-Assad. This suggests that the members of the People's Assembly will likely follow the directives of Hamcho and Ghassan Bilal regarding official economic matters.
Notably, several militia leaders close to the Fourth Division and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard successfully became Syrian parliamentarians, such as Madlul Aziz from Deir ez-Zor and Jihad Barakat, known for his close ties with Hezbollah. Additionally, Ammar al-Assad, whose brother Wisam al-Assad collaborates with the notorious Lebanese drug dealer Noah Zaiter, along with the prominent drug trafficker Hassan Shaaban al-Bari from Aleppo and its countryside, who has played a significant role in suppressing anti-Assad protests since 2011.
This indicates a division within the Syrian state: one faction seeks to enhance the state’s economic image through Damascus merchants led by Hamcho, while the other justifies the militarization of society, directing youth towards security companies primarily tasked with recruiting youth for Hezbollah, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, or Russia's military engagements in Ukraine. This latter faction is divided across provinces, with its highest leadership residing in the Fourth Division under Maher al-Assad.
Maher al-Assad's current filling of the power vacuum does not signify the end of Bashar al-Assad's role but rather reflects a longstanding strategy within the Assad family. Since Hafez al-Assad's reign, he sought to position his brother Rifaat al-Assad as an opposition figure. Despite their public disagreements, Rifaat's children were allowed to invest freely in Syria. Today, Bashar and Maher al-Assad seem to exchange financial influence superficially, yet both effectively steer a single vessel titled "Our Families First; Syria is Our Estate," with economists and parliamentarians merely puppets in their hands.
[1] The United States imposed sanctions on Mohammad Hamsho on August 4, 2011, and the European Union followed with its sanctions on May 23, 2011. These sanctions include asset freezes and travel bans, targeting Hamsho due to his support for the Assad regime. His companies, including "Hamsho International Group," are also involved and are major entities supporting the Syrian regime.
https://data.europa.eu/apps/eusanctionstracker/subjects/7543
https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-gbbKofvPLBW6szUysavyQb/
[2] Firas Klass is known for his role as the Director of the Syria Trust for Development (STD), which is closely associated with Asma al-Assad, the wife of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
Klass has been implicated in facilitating activities that help sustain the Assad regime's power, particularly through managing the distribution of aid and resources that often support the regime’s interests. As a result of his involvement, Firas Klass, along with other key figures in the Assad regime, has faced U.S. sanctions aimed at curbing the influence and financial operations of those associated with the Syrian government.
[3] Lina Al-Kinaya is the Director of the Office of the Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic at the Presidential Palace, and she is married to former Deputy Muhammad Hamam Masouti.
[4] Syrian People's Counci / official Website/ Legislative Session 2016-2020
[5] Names of successful candidates in the 2024 Syrian People's Assembly elections/SANA official news agency
