On November 29, 2024, the opponents who stormed the headquarters of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the governor of Aleppo's palace discovered numerous goods not intended for sale, provided by the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) in those offices. Notably, these foods were meant for poor civilians, yet the widespread corruption within the Syrian regime's institutions seized the majority of the aid and redirected it to the army and its loyal Shiite militias.

This example highlights a general state of corruption in areas controlled by the Syrian regime, where electricity in Aleppo was provided for only four hours a day, citing a lack of sufficient fuel to operate generators. Simultaneously, the regime was selling fuel at inflated prices on the black market. With the opposition taking control of the city, Aleppo experienced, for the first time since the outbreak of the civil war, the return of electricity to many neighborhoods. Maintenance teams were asked to resume their usual work to repair damaged cables, and civilian organizations in Aleppo initiated repairs on water pipes, making drinking water available to several neighborhoods in the city center after the third day of the regime's fall.

On the first day of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham fighters entering the Christian neighborhoods, one extremist fighter attempted to remove a Christmas tree from a square. However, he was reprimanded by his leaders. Opposition fighters spread throughout the Christian neighborhoods to protect them from any irresponsible acts of vandalism. Some food supplies, such as "rice, lentils, and flour," were distributed for free to families, and they were reassured that their rights would be respected, allowing them to practice their religious rituals during celebrations like Saint Barbara's Day, Christmas, and New Year.

Markets remained open, but a curfew was imposed from 7 AM to 7 PM. Kurdish fighters stationed in Sheikh Maqsoud and Sheikh Najjar neighborhoods were asked to surrender their weapons or secure a route to leave the city for Raqqa, where the Kurdish People's Protection Units allied with the Syrian Democratic Forces are based. Many opposition fighters positioned themselves atop buildings with snipers to target anyone considering causing unrest; however, no sniper attacks were reported against any civilians or armed individuals.

On December 4, a statement from the military operations room responsible for the attacks announced that all military presence would leave the city within weeks, to be replaced by a civilian administration from Aleppo coordinating with the Rescue Government, representing the civilian wing of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Notably, the armed factions did not display their flags; instead, they unified their symbol with the flag of the Syrian revolution.

These changes indicated a notably acceptable level of stability in Syria's second-largest city after it was overtaken by the armed opposition, consisting of a coalition of (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the National Army, and various opposition factions). A significant mistake made by the opposition was releasing criminal prisoners without assessing their danger level, resulting in some kidnapping incidents whose perpetrators remain unknown.

The Syrian regime did not engage in battles in Aleppo and Idlib; instead, limited clashes occurred until a mass escape of Syrian army fighters and security units was facilitated. Russian fighters also withdrew from the airports of Abu Dhuhur “Abu al-Duhur Air Base", Aleppo, and Hama, and the Russian military police exited without any clashes from the Russian-Turkish observation points, vacating their headquarters in Tal Rifaat. This indicates a Russian-Turkish understanding that keeps Russia out of the Aleppo battles, aiming to exert political pressure on the Syrian regime for a political settlement that would transform the country from one under Iranian influence to one for the Syrians.

The dilemma is that the Syrian regime in Damascus is unable to distance itself from Iran. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Damascus on December 1, 2024, assuring Assad of Iran's commitment to supporting the stability of the Syrian regime by all means. Subsequently, he moved towards Turkey to persuade the Turks to exert their influence over the Syrian opposition fighters to deter them from advancing to Damascus.

The Russian Dilemma

The Russians were taken aback by the weakness of the Syrian regime, especially since general security reports had indicated that the opposition was preparing to storm the city of Aleppo. It was widely believed that the battles that erupted on November 27, 2024, aimed to pressure Damascus into accepting a settlement with Turkey under Russian sponsorship. Many anticipated that these battles would last several months before reaching Aleppo, but Aleppo and its surrounding areas, along with the entire Idlib province, fell in just two days, and by the third day, opposition forces were on the outskirts of Hama. Consequently, Putin felt that General Sergei Kiselyov's assessments regarding Russian military operations in Syria were illogical, leading him to dismiss Kiselyov from his position. It is likely that General Alexander Chekho will be appointed to manage the battles in Damascus, provided that Russia receives financial compensation for its military efforts. Abbas Araqchi spoke with Sergey Lavrov on November 30, 2024, promising a substantial financial sum if Russia supported the Shiite militias that would be dispatched to assist the Syrian army from the air.

The dilemma for the Russians lies in their inability to manage ground battles; their role is confined to airstrikes, alongside logistical and intelligence support for ground forces. Nevertheless, several of their advisors and soldiers were sent to the Hama front, as evidenced by videos shared on social media.

Bashar al-Assad recognized the weakness of his forces, prompting him to reach out to the Iraqi government, which expressed its readiness to support Syria militarily, security-wise, and financially. However, Iraq soon retracted its position due to international pressures, as the Iraqi army leadership indicated a willingness to deploy its forces along the Iraqi border to prevent any infiltrators from the opposition from entering its territory. Nonetheless, secretly, a significant number of Popular Mobilization Forces fighters began to move into Syrian territory without heavy equipment. Certainly, restructuring the operations of these fighters by Iranian Revolutionary Guard advisors to prepare them for battle would take more than two months. Therefore, the Syrian regime sought to strengthen its forces through three approaches:

1.        Increasing the salaries of army personnel by 50%.

2.        Allocating a monthly salary of 3 million Syrian pounds, equivalent to $200, for each member of the military intelligence-affiliated military units.

3.        Allocating a monthly salary of 7 million Syrian pounds, equivalent to $466, for any member of the Suhail al-Hassan forces, nicknamed "the Tiger."

Brigadier General Suhail al-Hassan was tasked with managing the battles in Hama, viewing Hama as a defensive pivot to prevent the opposition from reaching Homs. Consequently, fortifications in the towns of this province were enhanced, and elite forces from the Syrian army were brought in to support the 25th Division. The Syrian regime is adamant about not losing this province, as its loss would mean the opposition reaching the city of Homs, thereby posing a series of threats to both the Syrian and Iranian regimes, the most significant of which are:

1.        Cutting the international road linking the coast and Damascus, which threatens the economic collapse of the Syrian regime.

2.        Gaining control of the city of Qusayr, which serves as the most crucial military supply route for Hezbollah in Syrian territory.

3.        The opposition's control over several Alawite and Murshidi villages that support the regime.

From this perspective, we might expect the battles in Hama to extend, turning this province into a kind of demarcation line between the Syrian regime supported by Russia and Iran, and the armed opposition backed by Ankara. 

If the armed opposition succeeds in surpassing Hama province and reaching Homs, this would compel Hezbollah to abandon Lebanon and engage with the armed opposition at Tehran's command, as losing Homs would signify the loss of everything Iran has achieved over three decades in Syria, and would also mark the beginning of Assad's downfall