The Syrian political opposition has long suffered from the lack of a military entity committed to its decisions. Despite the existence of a Ministry of Defense in the interim Syrian government formed by the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, some armed factions operate independently with their own decisions and without referring to the directives of the Ministry of Defense. The Minister of Defense or the Prime Minister of the interim Syrian government cannot rein in that military activity; hence, it was necessary to enhance meetings between Syrian political and military leaders to bridge the gaps among them.
Both Qatar and Turkey represent the guarantors and facilitators of these meetings, as both countries are funders and hosts of the armed and political Syrian opposition. Therefore, a meeting was held at Gaziantep Airport in Turkey near the Syrian-Turkish border on September 3, 2024, under the direct supervision of the Turkish Foreign Ministry and intelligence. Representatives from the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, the interim Syrian government, the Negotiation Commission, the Council of Tribes and Clans, and leaders from the Syrian National Army attended this meeting.
A verbal altercation was observed during the meeting between the Prime Minister of the interim government, Abdul Rahman Mustafa, and leaders of two military factions, namely "the Sham Front led by Abu al-Izz Sarqib" and "the Movement for Liberation and Construction, led by Abu Hatim Shaqra." Following this altercation, the Sham Front issued a statement on September 4, 2024, announcing the suspension of its work with the interim government until the change and accountability of Prime Minister Abdul Rahman Mustafa.
It is noteworthy that the Sham Front is an armed wing spread within the Third Corps of the National Army, while the Movement for Liberation and Construction, whose components have criticized Abdul Rahman Mustafa, is a main component in the First Corps of the National Army. In fact, the National Army consists of three corps, with the Sham Front and the Movement for Liberation and Construction being among the most prominent components of those military corps, which gives a clear indication of the impossibility of the Prime Minister's dealings with the National Army forces, or that this position may lead to the fragmentation of the National Army and the escalation of disputes among its ranks.
If the Sham Front were to defect, the National Army would lose about ten thousand fighters, and the defection of the Movement for Liberation and Construction could lead to a loss of approximately eight thousand fighters. Beyond the numbers of recruits, greater issues will arise, the most prominent of which are:
· Who will manage the crossings entrusted "Borders" to both armed wings?
· Will the National Army be dominated by the Hamza Division led by Saif Bolad, nicknamed "Abu Bakr," from the Joint Force, or by the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division led by Muhammad al-Jasim, nicknamed "Abu Amsha"? Given that these two armed wings are accepted by Prime Minister Abdul Rahman Mustafa.
The real dilemma is that the Hamza Division and the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division established in 2023 an alliance called the "Joint Force," which is part of the Second Corps of the National Army led by "Fahim Issa." However, they are not committed to the military decisions issued by the corps commander, Fahim Issa. Hence, we understand that the "Joint Force" is an operations room nominally included in the National Army but operates independently.
As external observers, when we analyze this data, we come to the conclusion that the National Army is a fragmented body, lacking discipline in a structured military institutional framework, and the actors within it have not matured to operate within a rational behavior capable of managing the areas of the Euphrates Shield and Peace Spring in a way that ensures the humanitarian safety of the residents in those areas. As for the Turks, they are not resolute in imposing a military institutional structure on the Syrian factions affiliated with the National Army; rather, they seek to open political and military spaces that allow these armed forces to meet in order to organize themselves autonomously. In fact, this is a democratic administrative behavior, but it does not succeed with groups that have specialized in military profiteering. Many of the military leaders of these factions have not been honest in distributing the wealth they have acquired from the border crossings they oversee, and some of them are accused of human rights violations, with direct accusations against them from European and American foreign ministries, which makes them unqualified to engage in institutional work in international alliances that could support the National Army to play its role in combating terrorist groups or even the Syrian regime.
If we look at the structure of the opposition factions and their alliances, we see significant contradictions and illogical alliances that often change after several months. For example, the Unified Command Room "AZM" was formed from the alliance of the Sham Front and the Sultan Murad Brigade on July 15, 2021. However, this room was dissolved, resulting in two military bodies:
The first called "The Syrian Liberation Front," which included the following factions in September 2021: (Hamza Brigade, Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade, 20th Division, Suqour al-Sham Brigades, and Al-Mu'tasim Brigade).
· The second was named "Thairun Movement," which included the following factions in October 2021: (Sultan Murad Brigade, Sham Legion, Sham Revolutionaries, Al-Muntasir Billah Brigade, Northern Division, 9th Brigade, and 112th Brigade).
After the withdrawal of the "Sultan Murad Brigade" from the Unified Command Room "AZM" and its joining of the "Thairun Movement," the Sham Front was forced to establish another military alliance called "The Third Corps," which included the following military factions on October 18, 2021: (Sham Front, Army of Islam, Glory Legion, 51st Division, Peace Brigade, and Malik Shah Brigade). However, this alliance suffered a painful blow in November 2022 from Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, which was supported by several factions affiliated with the National Army, namely (Hamza Brigade, Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade, Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement, and Ahrar al-Sham) where the Third Corps' headquarters in the Afrin area of northern Aleppo was attacked, under the pretext that the Third Corps had attacked the Hamza Brigade's headquarters in the "Bab" area after confirming the involvement of leaders in the Hamza Brigade in the killing of media activist "Mohammad Abdul Latif Abu Ghanoum" and his wife.
In light of this military dispute, a clear type of estrangement was observed between the Sham Front on one side and both the Hamza Brigade and Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade on the other side. As a result, the Hamza Brigade and the Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade announced in January 2023 the establishment of what is called "The Joint Force," which many elements of the Third Corps have spread rumors about being the arm of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham within the National Army, which the "Joint Force" denies.
The disputes among the aforementioned factions are an extension of old disputes in the Damascus countryside, and these disputes do not concern the people of Deir ez-Zor province, who are discontented with the growing influence of the Syrian Democratic Forces in the Syrian Jazira region. Therefore, the factions affiliated with the Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa regions sought to establish a new alliance called (Movement for Liberation and Construction), which included the following factions: (Ahrar al-Sharqiya, al-Sharqiya Army “Lions of the East Army”, 20th Division, Suqour al-Sham Brigades).
From here, a state of regional clustering emerges in the National Army, and these clusters carry within them priorities for each military cluster individually, where each military cluster seeks to impose its agenda as a priority that should be adopted by the Syrian interim government. Meanwhile, the Syrian interim government and the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces are far removed from the local affairs of the residents of areas not under the control of the Syrian regime, leaving those tasks to what are called local councils, whose leaders prefer to coordinate their work directly with the Turkish government. This reality has made the Syrian interim government weak in its arguments before the military brigades, which, in essence, do not base their work on the Ministry of Defense but coordinate their activities with the more organized Turks.