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The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union marked a significant turning point for many Central and Eastern European countries not only in the sense that they stopped being Soviet satellite states and the new process of democratization was initiated. In terms of foreign policies, orientation towards the European Union (of which the majority of former Eastern Bloc states later on became members) and trans-Atlantic links. The Czech Republic, born on 1st January 1993 after Czechoslovakia was dissolved in an unprecedented “peaceful divorce”, was no different. This also meant that relations with Africa, which we discussed in Part 1 essay, lost the prominence and Africa as such was literally abandoned by practically all consecutive post-Communist Czech governments.
The number of embassies was reduced, so that basically the northern African belt (from Morocco to Egypt) was kept, plus the key three “powers” – Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa. The following 30+ years of existence of the Czech Republic witnessed some changes in the structure of the Czech diplomatic missions in Africa. In anyway, the number of diplomatic missions was much smaller after 1993 than anytime between 1960s and 1980s.
The Czech Republic, as an export economy, gave priority to the Western and trans-Atlantic markets which made sense in the post-1989 world but at the same time now we see it was a big mistake to fully abandon the African links and markets and especially the existing connections there. Why?
As we discussed in the previous part, there are at least two reasons for this claim. The first is the community of African students who gained education in former Czechoslovakia and came back to their home countries with a long-term prospects to become “clients” of Czechoslovak industry, export/import, investments, trade. Many of these former students became successful businessmen, politicians, even ministers and presidents. With the “withdrawal” from Africa, this important community was almost “forgotten” by official channels. The second important group is that composed of all kinds of experts – engineers, geologists, linguists, and many others – who served in various African countries for years building up networks, connections, clientele, which is of paramount importance when in comes to maintaining business links. Doing business in Africa (in general) is a bit different, from the Central European perspective, than doing business in, say, Germany or Sweden. One cannot rely solely on email correspondence or abstract contacts. What is very much needed is a direct and long-term relationship with clients, partners, colleagues, and those who are supposed to be in that “chain.”
For several decades, Africa remained the last of the “priorities” of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, regardless which political parties formed the government. Only in 2021, the recent government of Petr Fiala (Prime Minister) adopted a new “Strategy for Africa” which is the very first document with an attempt to serve as a guiding principle for future relations with Africa. However, it was the war in Ukraine which gave this strategy even bigger relevance. In the changing world order in which the international playground is moving from unilateralism to multilateralism with China, Russia, India and others (connected via BRICS) gain more and more prominence especially in the Global South, there is a space for smaller and medium-sized countries with a “good name” to step in and use its potential in order to offer an alternative to the West (the original members of the EU plus the USA in this sense) which is losing its credibility in Africa. In many African countries which I have had an experience with, one can see what kind of legacies the name “Czechoslovakia” has left, not using this potential for such a long time was a great mistake.
Although the document defines and designs priority areas of the Czech policy in regard to Africa, one of its main missions is to fight Russian hybrid influence and engagement in Africa. Russia is operating in Africa via a variety of means, from the use of private military groups to creation of internet hubs for spreading fake news and all kinds of propaganda, it is a combination of “Kalashnikov diplomacy” and IT, in a way.
The main problem of the “Czech strategy” is that although it defines four key areas: stability, prosperity and sustainability, health, and education, it seems that the main priority of the Czech government lies in soft areas related to the Russian presence in Africa – i.e. Russian disinformation scene. This is not to say that doing so (= fighting Russian propaganda) should be wrong. This is to say, that in order to become a relevant and respected partner with whom African counterparts would deal openly and honestly, fighting Russian propaganda is not enough. Especially, when one considers how the world has changed in last two decades and what kind of space the BRICS countries currently have mainly in Africa, a continent whose significance only increased (for instance within the UN General Assembly) since the war in Ukraine.
It was primarily the war in Ukraine which seems to keep dividing the African continent and one of the main reasons is that African continent is very young, the average age in practically all countries on the continent is very low, compared to Europe. Younger generation has much better access to all kinds of information, but they also live in rapidly changing world in which the Chinese, Turkish, Indian, Emirati or other investors have built new railways, highways, hospitals, or industries literally overnight. The dynamics of change in Africa is unprecedented and the young generation feels, in many parts of Africa, that there is no more need to follow and obey what the West thinks or says. There are many others whose opinion is more relevant. Moreover, what we can see especially in the Sahel region, with France losing its firm ground and Russia in a certain sense replacing Paris as a key “security partner”, is a necessary result of decades of French, or generally Western, hypocrisy in Africa. This has been documented elsewhere and widely, for instance, on disadvantageous contracts on extraction of uranium, oil, gold, and other resources done by French companies in Francophone Africa. Logically, Russia is actively trying to use this void and all kinds of platforms to step in especially in the security and mining sectors, as Russia has very little to offer beyond these two.
The point is, however, that the Czech policy towards Africa should not be centred around fighting Russian influence in Africa while doing close to nothing in terms of investments (something that was the cornerstone of Czechoslovak-African relations back then), tangible and increasing bilateral trade, supporting African industrialization, and smart educational policy. Only at that moment, one can take the “fighting Russian propaganda in Africa” scenario seriously from the African point of view. The world has changed since late 1980s, and African governments are very sensitive when it comes to foreign “mentoring” and “patronizing” voices that reach out to African ears. If the Czech foreign policy wishes to use the positive legacy of the good name of Czechoslovakia, it should reconsider its economic policies primarily.
