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Every day, caravans of Lebanese Shiites cross the Syrian border, believing that their journey is simple and reminiscent of what occurred in July 2006. Their best option is the relatively safer Syria compared to Lebanon, along with their ability to pay rent for a longer duration in Syria than in central and northern Lebanon. However, the economic reality in Syria, particularly in Damascus, is disappointing, as rents have surged by nearly 70% since the initial wave of displacement, with the price for two rooms in central Damascus reaching about 4.5 million Syrian pounds, equivalent to approximately $300. In contrast, the same apartment in rural Damascus, Latakia, or Tartus costs around 1.5 million Syrian pounds, or about $100. This situation has made Damascus and its outskirts accessible only to wealthy or middle-income Lebanese, while poorer Shiites have been dispersed into schools converted by the Syrian government into makeshift shelters.
These camps are clearly ill-equipped to handle the growing numbers each day, prompting many impoverished Lebanese families to reach out to Hezbollah fighters in Syria for assistance. The most obvious option for them is Deir ez-Zor province, which has a strong and significant presence of Hezbollah fighters and is one of the least bombed areas by Israel, despite being a major intelligence hub for Iran between Syria and Iraq, with many homes abandoned by their owners who joined the Syrian opposition.
Hezbollah has transformed the town of Salhiya, located 80 km from Deir ez-Zor city, into a security camp, in addition to the deployment of its fighters in the cities of Al-Bukamal and Deir ez-Zor. Notably, international coalition forces have conducted several airstrikes against Hezbollah camps and Shiite militias, yet these militias have not changed their positions, as if they are mobilized for a phase of transferring displaced persons from Syria to Iraq.
Recently, more than a hundred families from Lebanon arrived in the city of Deir ez-Zor, and facilities were provided for their stay in the city of Al-Bukamal. Still, most of them returned and settled inside the city of Deir ez-Zor. It was noteworthy that some of these families have relatives or children who are fighters stationed in Deir ez-Zor, indicating that Hezbollah fighters, after the deaths of their leaders in Beirut, have not returned to Lebanon but have adhered to the directives of Iranian leaders in the Deir ez-Zor area.
The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces have designated areas in Diyala province in southern Iraq to host Lebanese Shiite displaced persons, providing them with furnished hotel apartments equipped with all necessities until they can move to apartments that suit their needs. So far, a significant number of Lebanese families have not reached southern Iraq, as the general belief among these families is that the battle in southern Lebanon may be limited and not exceed two months, leading them to prefer temporary settlement in Syria.
However, it is noteworthy that many Hezbollah fighters, especially those close to " Ali Musa Daqduq," the commander of the so-called Golan Liberation Front, have urged their families to move to Iraq, convinced that the chances of a swift return to Lebanon are diminishing. The southern Lebanon region appears to be a stage for military attrition, with most towns devastated, and those that remain are cracked. The sewage and drinking water infrastructure has been destroyed, making the chances of rehabilitating life nearly impossible.
The development of these areas necessitates a safe return of Lebanese state institutions and a substantial financial support program dedicated to reconstruction, which is, in reality, unattainable in a state overwhelmed by corruption, indebted to its citizens and the World Bank, and lacking institutional stability. The salary of a Lebanese soldier before the war was around 24,535,200 Lebanese pounds, equivalent to approximately $273, which is a very low salary. The dilemma is that this salary is in a state of continuous decline against the backdrop of the collapsing Lebanese pound, forcing soldiers into corruption rather than fulfilling their roles in maintaining security and stability in southern Lebanon.
Before the major Israeli assault on September 17-18, 2024, families supported by Hezbollah were receiving salaries and aid through support cards similar to the "Food Stamp" program, issued by banks that receive funds from Hezbollah's "Good Loan: Al-Kard Al-Hassan" program. Most stores dealing with these cards were located in neighborhoods supportive of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement. Now, many of those shops have been destroyed or their owners have fled, complicating the provision of assistance to displaced families. Additionally, due to breaches in Lebanese and Hezbollah communications, many Hezbollah activists involved in economic logistics have begun to avoid public appearances or direct coordination to address gaps in the financial or food support systems for displaced families.
The issue is that this support system does not exist in Syria, limiting the chances of Lebanese Shiite families continuing to live in Syria to the assistance provided by Shiite religious authorities or Shiite brigades in the areas of Sayyida Zainab and Sayyida Ruqayya.
The ongoing Israeli targeting of Syrian territories, along with the extent of security breaches affecting many Hezbollah leaders and fighters inside Syria, has rendered the areas of Damascus and its outskirts unstable, making Iraq appear to be a safer area. Iraqis offer opportunities for the integration of Lebanese children into educational institutions for free, fully cover rents for displaced families, and provide them with free food baskets.
In the Deir ez-Zor area, Iraqi militias and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard are attempting to provide similar support, but the predominantly Sunni Arab tribal community complicates integration opportunities with Lebanese Shiite refugees. Thus, southern Iraq may be an ideal location if there is an Iranian and regional plan to establish a Shiite canton in Iraq that overshadows other components in a state rich in Shiite militias, especially since these militias are supported by neighboring Iran, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard exerts influence over them and on Lebanese Shiites affiliated with Hezbollah.
Furthermore, Lebanese Shiites may represent a significant opportunity for the development of the Iraqi Shiite community, transforming it from a backward tribal state into a more civil state, as Lebanese Shiites are generally better educated than Iraqi Shiites, and their ability to integrate into diverse cultures is significantly superior. This is something that Iraqi Shiites truly need, as regions in Iraq with a Shiite majority are rich in oil, yet opportunities for economic and social development are severely limited due to corruption, the absence of strategic planning, and the pursuit of metaphysical matters linked to religious thought. Changing this culture will certainly not be smooth; it requires Shiite religious figures with strong academic backgrounds, which is something available among Lebanese Shiites.
Thus, this war may represent a crucial phase in redrawing the map of the Middle East, paving the way for a more developed Shiite system in Iraq extending to Syria, thereby balancing the Sunni presence in the Deir ez-Zor areas with the Shiites extending from Iraq to Damascus.
