The Horn of Africa has historically represented one of the world’s most contested geopolitical spaces. Situated at the intersection of Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean, the region has repeatedly attracted external powers seeking control over strategic maritime routes, commercial networks, and political alliances. However, the geopolitical landscape of the Horn is undergoing a significant transformation. What was previously understood primarily as competition between global powers has evolved into a multidimensional struggle involving Middle Eastern states, emerging regional actors, and African governments pursuing their own strategic interests.
The contemporary Horn of Africa is characterised by the convergence of several interconnected crises: Ethiopia’s unresolved internal conflicts, the devastating civil war in Sudan, persistent insecurity in Somalia, tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the growing strategic importance of the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. These developments are increasingly influenced by the competing ambitions of Türkiye, Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Egypt, China, and other external actors.
Yet the region should not be understood merely as a passive battlefield for foreign interests. African governments, political elites, armed movements, and commercial actors actively negotiate, exploit, and sometimes manipulate external competition to strengthen their domestic and regional positions. The central geopolitical challenge is therefore not simply the presence of foreign powers, but the growing interaction between external rivalries and unresolved local conflicts.
From Great-Power Competition to Multipolar Rivalry
The geopolitical importance of the Horn of Africa is hardly a recent phenomenon. During the Cold War, Ethiopia and Somalia became central arenas of Soviet-American competition, with military assistance, ideological alignments, and regional wars reflecting the broader confrontation between the two superpowers. The post-Cold War period introduced new actors and new forms of engagement, gradually transforming the region into a more fragmented and multipolar geopolitical environment.
China’s economic expansion, particularly through infrastructure investments and its military presence in Djibouti, has challenged traditional Western influence. Meanwhile, Türkiye has developed extensive diplomatic, commercial, humanitarian, and military relations with Somalia. Gulf countries have invested heavily in ports, logistics, agriculture, and security partnerships, while Egypt has continued to regard developments in Ethiopia and the Nile Basin through the prism of its national security.
These developments demonstrate that contemporary competition extends far beyond military installations. Control over commercial infrastructure, access to ports, political patronage, arms transfers, and diplomatic mediation have become equally important instruments of influence.
The growing involvement of Middle Eastern powers is particularly consequential. Unlike the relatively structured bipolar confrontation of the Cold War, today’s rivalries are fluid, overlapping, and frequently contradictory. Countries that cooperate economically may simultaneously support opposing political actors or pursue competing security objectives.
Türkiye, Israel, and the Emerging Red Sea Security Competition
One of the most significant recent developments has been the intensification of competition between Türkiye and Israel in the Horn of Africa. Türkiye has gradually established itself as one of Somalia’s most influential external partners through military training, infrastructure development, diplomatic engagement, and security cooperation. Ankara’s involvement reflects its ambition to consolidate its position as an influential actor connecting the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Africa. Somalia offers Türkiye access to the western Indian Ocean and an opportunity to demonstrate its capacity to provide security assistance and political mediation beyond its immediate neighbourhood.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025 has introduced a new geopolitical dimension. Somaliland’s position along the Gulf of Aden, opposite Yemen, offers potential strategic advantages for intelligence gathering, maritime surveillance, and monitoring Houthi activities. Israel’s interest in Somaliland must therefore be understood in the broader context of Red Sea security and its confrontation with Iranian-aligned actors.
However, interpreting these developments exclusively as a direct Turkish-Israeli confrontation would oversimplify the situation. Israel’s immediate strategic considerations are closely connected to Yemen and maritime security, while Türkiye’s engagement with Somalia is rooted in a much longer process of political and military cooperation.
Nevertheless, the two countries’ activities increasingly intersect. Türkiye supports Somalia’s territorial integrity, whereas Israel’s recognition of Somaliland strengthens the latter’s international aspirations. Consequently, a longstanding dispute over sovereignty and statehood is becoming entangled with wider Middle Eastern geopolitical competition.
This development also demonstrates how local political actors exercise agency. Somaliland’s leadership has pursued international recognition for decades and may regard new partnerships as opportunities to strengthen its diplomatic position. Somalia, conversely, can use external security cooperation to reinforce its sovereignty claims. The danger is that competing external commitments could harden existing divisions and reduce incentives for political compromise.
Gulf Rivalries and the Political Economy of Proxy Conflict
The growing influence of Gulf states represents another fundamental transformation of the regional security environment. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have pursued different combinations of economic investment, diplomatic engagement, and security cooperation across the Horn. The UAE has become particularly influential through its involvement in ports, logistics, and commercial networks, as well as its relationships with political and security actors. Saudi Arabia’s interests are closely linked to Red Sea security, maritime commerce, and its broader regional position. Qatar has also sought influence through diplomacy and political relationships, particularly in Somalia.
These activities cannot be separated from the broader political economy of regional conflict. Commercial ports are not merely economic facilities; they may also become instruments of political leverage and strategic influence. Similarly, financial assistance and security partnerships can reinforce particular political elites while weakening the bargaining position of their rivals.
The civil war in Sudan illustrates the potentially destructive consequences of external involvement. Since April 2023, the confrontation between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has developed into a devastating conflict with profound humanitarian and regional implications. Allegations of external military support, competing diplomatic initiatives, and cross-border economic networks have further complicated prospects for a negotiated settlement.
Ethiopia, the Pretoria Agreement, and the Risk of Conflict Convergence
Ethiopia occupies a central position in this increasingly unstable regional environment. Its population, economic significance, military capabilities, and geographical location make it indispensable to the political and security architecture of the Horn of Africa. At the same time, Ethiopia’s landlocked status creates a structural dependence on neighbouring countries for maritime access.
The November 2022 Pretoria agreement, which formally ended the devastating war between the Ethiopian federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), represented an important opportunity to stabilise the country. However, the implementation of the agreement has remained contested, particularly regarding security arrangements, political authority, territorial disputes, and the restoration of normal governance.
Developments in 2026 have exposed the fragility of the peace process. Renewed tensions, armed confrontations, and disputes over Tigray’s political administration have raised serious concerns about the possibility of another major conflict. One interpretation of these developments suggests that the TPLF has made a strategic miscalculation by increasingly relying on military pressure rather than political negotiation. According to this perspective, the movement underestimated the federal government’s capabilities, the changing regional balance of power, and the extent to which renewed hostilities could undermine its domestic and international legitimacy.
The most consequential danger is the potential convergence of Ethiopia’s domestic conflicts with wider regional rivalries. Tensions involving Eritrea, instability along the Sudanese border, and competing external security partnerships create an environment in which a local military confrontation could have consequences that extend far beyond Tigray.
For the TPLF, a return to large-scale military confrontation could be particularly costly, given the destruction experienced during the previous war and the political divisions within Tigray. For the federal government, another war would threaten national reconstruction, economic recovery, and Ethiopia’s regional diplomatic position. Ultimately, the survival of the Pretoria framework depends less on military calculations than on the restoration of credible political dialogue, enforceable commitments, and institutional arrangements acceptable to the principal parties.
The Red Sea, Maritime Access, and Regional Security
The Red Sea has become a critical nexus between the geopolitical crises in the Horn of Africa and those in the wider Middle East. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden, is essential to maritime traffic connecting Europe and Asia through the Suez Canal. Attacks on commercial shipping associated with the conflict in Yemen, together with wider instability in the Middle East, have reinforced the strategic importance of alternative logistics networks and secure maritime corridors.
For Ethiopia, maritime access remains one of the country’s most sensitive strategic concerns. Dependence on Djibouti has encouraged Addis Ababa to explore alternative arrangements, including engagement with Somaliland. Ethiopia’s desire for more diversified maritime access is understandable from an economic perspective, but agreements involving contested territories can generate political resistance and potentially undermine regional stability.
Egypt’s relationship with Ethiopia adds another dimension. The longstanding dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has linked water security, regional diplomacy, and broader strategic alignments. Cairo’s engagement with Somalia and other regional partners must therefore be assessed within a wider framework of competing security concerns, rather than as an isolated diplomatic development.
Importantly, the strategic importance of the Red Sea does not automatically translate into a unified regional alliance. The interests of Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Türkiye, and Ethiopia overlap in some areas while diverging sharply in others.
Conclusion: Towards a More Fragmented Regional Order?
The Horn of Africa is entering a period in which the boundaries between domestic conflict, regional rivalry, and global geopolitical competition are becoming increasingly blurred. The confrontation between Türkiye and Israel, the strategic ambitions of Gulf states, Ethiopia’s internal instability, the Sudanese civil war, and the struggle for control of maritime corridors are no longer separate developments.
Three possible trajectories can be identified. The first involves continued fragmentation, with external powers strengthening competing political and security partnerships while local conflicts remain unresolved. The second entails more direct regional confrontation, particularly if Ethiopia’s internal conflicts become linked to interstate rivalries or if maritime security competition intensifies. The third, more constructive scenario would involve renewed regional diplomacy, stronger African-led mediation, and agreements that reconcile economic connectivity with territorial sovereignty. The central challenge for the Horn of Africa is therefore not how to eliminate external influence, which is neither realistic nor necessarily beneficial, but how to prevent geopolitical competition from reinforcing domestic fragmentation and violent conflict.